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2135 
NEW HEIGHTS, NEW USES, AND NEW 
QUESTIONS: CAN INDIVIDUALS ENFORCE 
THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS AGAINST THE 
IMPENDING RISE OF LOW-FLYING 
CIVILIAN DRONES? 
Abstract: By 2020, there will be at least seven million civilian drones flying in the 
low-altitude airspace above the United States. Civilian drones include unmanned 
aerial vehicles operated by both private individuals for recreational and business 
entities for commercial purposes. While this budding technology has the potential 
to be a positive influence on society as a whole, civilian drone regulation at both 
the state and federal level lags behind growing drone usage across the country. As 
of now, the Federal Aviation Administration has administered a small rule that pro-
vides some regulation on the use of civilian drones. Many questions remain, how-
ever, as to the property rights that landowners on the ground have against drones 
and their operators flying in the low-altitude airspace above their property. This 
Note examines the common law torts of trespass and nuisance and analyzes how 
both doctrines would apply to a drone flying low above an individual’s land. Fur-
thermore, this Note argues that the federal government is best suited to regulate ci-
vilian drones used for commercial purposes, whereas individual states should regu-
late the use of drones by private individuals. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 22, 2016, 7-Eleven became the first company in the United States 
to ever deliver its product to a consumer’s home via an unmanned, autono-
mous drone under approval of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).1 
Similarly, in November 2016, Domino’s Pizza completed its first delivery or-
der by drone in a town just north of Auckland, New Zealand.2 These two 
events are symbolic breakthroughs in global commerce and show that drones 
will revolutionize the way in which businesses and customers transact with 
                                                                                                                           
 1 7-Eleven Teams with Flirtey for First Ever FAA-Approved Drone Delivery to Customer’s 
Home, 7-ELEVEN (July 22, 2016), http://corp.7-eleven.com/corp-press-releases/07-22-2016-7-eleven-
teams-with-flirtey-for-first-ever-faa-approved-drone-delivery-to-customer-s-home [https://perma.cc/
2NY5-GRT9] [hereinafter 7-Eleven Teams with Flirtey]. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
is the executive agency responsible for regulating almost all aspects of civil aviation. What We Do, 
FAA, https://www.faa.gov/about/mission/activities/ [https://perma.cc/F5ZZ-5JRN]. 
 2 Kevin Lui, Watch Domino’s Pull Off the World’s First Commercial Pizza Delivery by Drone, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 16, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/16/dominos-new-zealand-first-commercial-
pizza-delivery-drone/ [https://perma.cc/T4PV-APL8]. 
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each other.3 Applications of drone delivery, however, are not limited to food 
and beverage distribution.4 For example, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos stated that 
the company is developing completely autonomous drones that will be able to 
deliver products within thirty minutes of the customer’s order.5 
Many other industries either already use civilian drones, or they have 
plans to use them in the near future.6 Some of these uses are conventional, 
such as realtors using drones to take aerial photos of prospective properties for 
their clients.7 At the other end of the spectrum, members of the technology in-
dustry are conceiving highly creative ways to put drones to use.8 Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerburg, for instance, is exploring the possibility of creating a 
drone that can provide Internet service to areas of the world without access.9 
Given the demand to use drones by both private citizens and commercial 
entities, the FAA moved quickly in June 2016 to create a small rule that gov-
erns the operation of unmanned drones by individuals and businesses.10 The 
new rule includes many restrictions, such as limiting drone flight only to day-
light hours, requiring the operator to be within the line-of-sight of the Un-
manned Aircraft System (“UAS”) at all times, and prohibiting the operation of 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See, e.g., 7-Eleven Teams with Flirtey, supra note 1 (stating that drone delivery provides maxi-
mum convenience for the customer and that 7-Eleven plans to make all of its products deliverable via 
drone in the future); Amazon Prime Air, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?ie=UTF8&
node=8037720011 [https://perma.cc/E49P-EV79] (detailing Amazon’s planned use of drones to de-
liver packages to consumers in thirty minutes or less). Amazon is by far the world’s largest online 
retailer in terms of online sales. Arthur Zaczkiewicz, Amazon, Wal-Mart and Apple Top List of Big-
gest E-Commerce Retailers, WWD (Apr. 7, 2017), http://wwd.com/business-news/business-features/
amazon-wal-mart-apple-biggest-e-commerce-retailers-10862796/ [https://perma.cc/5TAF-JLK7] (noting 
that Amazon’s total sales in a twelve-month period from 2016 to 2017 were more than the next forty-
nine online retailers’ sales combined during that same period). 
 4 See, e.g., Nathaniel Mott, Jeff Bezos Offers New Details on Amazon’s Delivery Drones, INVERSE 
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/22719-jeff-bezos-new-details-amazon-delivery-drones 
[https://perma.cc/E8BA-AAR7] (discussing Amazon’s planned use of drones to deliver packages to 
customers within thirty minutes of their order). 
 5 Id. The drones Amazon plans to use will fly at speeds greater than fifty miles per hour and be 
able to fly twenty miles round-trip and carry packages up to five pounds in weight. Id. 
 6 See Kevin D. Trost, Up, Up, and Away: Rising Legal Regulation of Drone Operation, WIS. 
LAW., Sept. 2016, at 16 (providing examples of the commercial uses of drones, including by realtors, 
photographers, television news stations, and factory farms). 
 7 See id. (describing drone use as a way to assist in ordinary business activities). 
 8 See id. (discussing Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s plan to use drones to bring Internet ser-
vice to remote parts of the world). 
 9 Id. Zuckerburg envisions using solar-powered drones that can fly for multiple years straight and 
has already purchased a company that creates drones. Id. 
 10 Bryan Wynne & Tim Day, Commercial Drones Are Cleared for Take Off, FORBES (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/10/28/commercial-drones-are-cleared-for-take-
off/#55cf5c32145c [https://perma.cc/V5PZ-VMJL]. Small Rule 107 is a federal regulation created by 
the FAA in order to regulate the operation of drones by both commercial operators and private citi-
zens. 14 C.F.R. § 107.1 (2016). 
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a UAS over individuals not involved in the flight.11 Almost all of the re-
strictions created by the rule, however, are waivable so long as the applicant 
can demonstrate that he or she can still operate the UAS safely.12 It seems that 
such waivers are not difficult to obtain—the FAA granted seventy-six waivers 
to applicants on the first day that the small rule came into effect.13 
In light of the FAA’s decision to minimally regulate UAS, property own-
ers will be left with many questions as to their rights with respect to drones 
occupying the low-altitude airspace over their homes.14 This Note argues that 
property owners should have a concrete way to enforce their property rights—
either through private causes of action or federal regulation—against UAS that 
enter the low-altitude airspace above their parcels.15 Part I provides an over-
view of the rise of civilian drones within the United States, an explanation of 
common law trespass and nuisance doctrines, and further information about 
current efforts to regulate drones.16 Part II examines how the common law 
causes of action of trespass and nuisance could apply to a drone flying in the 
low-altitude airspace above an individual’s property.17 Part III argues that, 
while a property owner could succeed in a trespass or nuisance suit against a 
drone operator, such an approach would be impractical and inadequate.18 Part 
III further argues that comprehensive federal regulation is the best solution to 
limit the impact of commercial drones on individual property rights and that 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See generally FAA, SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107) (2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DEL-AMGR] (stating that 
an operator cannot fly their drone over anyone on the ground who is not participating in the operation 
of the Unmanned Aircraft System (“UAS”), unless that person is under the cover of a structure or 
inside a motor vehicle). 
 12 Id. at 2; see 14 C.F.R. § 107.200(a) (“The Administrator may issue a certificate of waiver au-
thorizing a deviation from any regulation specified in [14 C.F.R.] § 107.205 if the Administrator finds 
that a proposed small UAS operation can safely be conducted under the terms of that certificate of 
waiver.”). The waiver request must fully describe the proposed drone operation, and the requestor 
must demonstrate how “the operation can safely be conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiv-
er.” 14 C.F.R. § 107.200(b). If approved, someone who receives a waiver may deviate from the re-
strictions set forth in the small rule as specified in the waiver and must also follow any conditions 
noted in the waiver as well. Id. § (d)(1)–(2). 
 13 See Wynne & Day, supra note 10 (noting the number of waivers granted on the first day of 
Small Rule 107’s enactment and arguing that these waivers are indicative of the FAA’s desire to regu-
late drones flexibly). 
 14 See SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), supra note 11, at 1 (stating 
that UAS must generally fly at a maximum altitude of four-hundred feet); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in 
an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 165 (2015) (noting that current property law, as it is under-
stood today, is not clear in establishing what rights a property owner has to keep drones or other low-
flying objects out of the airspace directly over their parcel). 
 15 See infra notes 166–210 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 20–122 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 123–165 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 171–186 and accompanying text. 
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states are in the best position to protect landowners’ property rights and priva-
cy against private drone operators.19 
I. DRONES, TRESPASS, AND NUISANCE 
Under common law, courts allow a property owner to bring a cause of ac-
tion for trespass against an individual who enters his or her land without prior 
approval by the owner.20 To succeed in a suit for trespass, the plaintiff must not 
have invited the defendant onto his or her property; the plaintiff also cannot 
sue if the defendant was carrying out a duty owed to the property owner.21 
Such a duty would likely arise, for instance, when a landowner contracts with 
another party to perform work on their land.22 Furthermore, a trespasser can be 
someone who “does so out of curiosity, or for his own purposes or conven-
ience.”23 Over time, however, courts have used common law trespass doctrine 
to determine whether a property owner is entitled to compensation for all kinds 
of bizarre intrusions, many of which a layperson would not envision as a po-
tential trespass.24 Recently, the growing use of private and commercial drones 
has raised questions as to what rights property owners have against drones fly-
ing relatively low in the airspace over their property.25 This Part details the rise 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 187–210 and accompanying text. 
 20 See, e.g., Heller v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 265 F. 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1920) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s son, who passed away after touching electrically-charged wire on the defendant’s property, 
was a trespasser). The child’s trespass was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant; therefore, the 
defendant did not act negligently in the child’s unfortunate death. Id. at 198–99. 
 21 Id. at 194. 
 22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 168 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that a 
landowner can create a specific, conditional privilege for another party to enter the land but that the 
party upon which the privilege was conferred cannot be on the land for any purpose other than the one 
for which the privilege was granted). 
 23 Heller, 265 F. at 194. In Heller, the plaintiff’s son was exploring the defendant’s property and 
accidentally killed himself after touching electric wire on the premises. Id. at 193. Thus, when stating 
that a trespasser can be someone who “does so out of curiosity, or for his own purposes or conven-
ience,” the court is making clear that a trespasser does not need to have nefarious intentions when 
making an unauthorized entry onto the plaintiff’s land in order for that entry to be a trespass. Id. at 
194. 
 24 See, e.g., Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331 (Mont. 1925) (holding that the defendant com-
mitted trespass when, standing on a neighboring parcel, he fired a shotgun over the plaintiff’s proper-
ty); Ivancic v. Olmstead, 488 N.E.2d 72, 74–75 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a landowner’s allowance of 
a rather large tree to naturally grow across her property line and into the airspace of her neighbor’s 
property did not constitute common law trespass); Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 79 N.E. 716, 718 (N.Y. 
1906) (holding that a telephone wire hung thirty feet above the plaintiff’s property by the defendant 
constituted a trespass). 
 25 See, e.g., Rule, supra note 14, at 165 (noting that current property law, as it is understood to-
day, is not clear in establishing what rights a property owner has to keep drones or other low-flying 
objects out of the airspace directly over their parcel). Property rights on the ground and at high alti-
tude, where airplanes travel, are far more clear-cut. Id. The Supreme Court has held that landowners 
do not have property rights in the high altitude airspace above their land. United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946). Similarly, it is well established that a landowner can impose trespass liabil-
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of civilian drones and how this new technology intersects with common law 
property rights and FAA regulations.26 Section A provides background infor-
mation about drones and their potential uses and government responses.27 Sec-
tion B explains trespass at common law and provides examples of cases in which 
parties used common law trespass doctrine to enforce their air rights.28 Section C 
examines the tort of nuisance, including privacy principles, at common law and 
analyzes how courts apply this doctrine to different sets of facts.29 
A. The Rise of Civilian Drones in the Modern World  
and Government Response 
Unmanned drones are poised to explode in use by both private citizens 
and business entities.30 Congress passed the Federal Aviation Administration 
Modernization and Reform Act in 2012 which required the FAA to create regu-
lations that will assimilate the flight of drones in U.S. airspace.31 The FAA 
predicts drone sales to increase from 2.5 million in 2016 to at least seven mil-
lion in 2020.32 Although drone technology originated in the military, techno-
logical advancements in recent years have made production for civilian pur-
poses inexpensive and operation simpler.33 
                                                                                                                           
ity on one who intentionally enters his or her land without permission, regardless of whether any dam-
age is caused. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158. 
 26 See infra notes 30–122 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 30–53 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 54–98 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 99–122 and accompanying text. 
 30 See, e.g., Lui, supra note 2 (using Domino’s Pizza’s delivery of pizza via drone as an example 
of how businesses will eventually make regular use of drones to deliver their products to consumers in 
a more cost-effective, timely manner). 
 31 Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101). The purpose of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration Modernization and Reform Act is to “streamline programs, create efficiencies, 
reduce waste, and improve aviation safety and capacity, to provide stable funding for the national 
aviation system, and for other purposes.” Id. It specifically requires relevant government and industry 
parties to create a plan to “safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the 
national airspace system.” Id. 
 32 See A. Michael Froomkin & Ryan Calo, Should You Be Allowed to Prevent Drones from Flying 
Over Your Property?, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-be-allowed-
to-prevent-drones-from-flying-over-your-property-1463968981 [https://perma.cc/QX74-MYME] (de-
scribing how the FAA predicts at least seven million drones will be flying in U.S. skies by 2020). 
 33 See Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to Domestic 
Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2014) (stating that, in as early as 2012, approxi-
mately fifty companies were producing numerous drone models and that some UAS models designed 
for civilian use can be controlled via smartphone or tablet); Ben Zimmer, The Flight of “Drone” from 
Bees to Planes, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2013, at C4 (discussing the use of drones by the U.S. Navy in 
the years leading up to World War II); see also Julia L. Chen, Note, Restoring Constitutional Balance: 
Accommodating the Evolution of War, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1788–90 (2012) (providing a history of 
the rise of drones in the U.S. military). 
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Drones have become affordable for many private citizens.34 Their capa-
bilities have also increased, as drones available for private use can fly for well 
over an hour and are able to take high quality picture and video.35 If drones 
available for civilian use continue to follow in the footsteps of military-grade 
drones, future models available to the public will fly for much longer periods 
of time and will be able to take even higher quality photographs and videos.36 
The use of drones for non-commercial purposes by private citizens has al-
ready begun to cause problems that raise questions about their legality.37 Pri-
vate drone operators have, for example, flown their UAS above professional 
baseball games, directly outside the windows of private, high-rise apartment 
buildings, and even near fireworks shows.38 Even the use of drones by law en-
forcement for surveillance has led to questions about the legality of such tac-
tics.39 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Farber, supra note 33, at 14 (noting that a private individual could purchase a drone for as 
little as $300 in 2014); Holy Stone HS170 Mini RC Predator Mini RC Helicopter Drone 2.4Ghz 6-
Axis Gyro 4 Channels Quadcopter Good Choice for Drone Training, https://www.amazon.com/Holy-
Stone-Predator-Helicopter-Quadcopter/dp/B0157IHJMQ [https://perma.cc/DZ6E-296V] [hereinafter 
Holy Stone HS170 Mini RC Predator] (selling, at the time of publication, a drone for under $50). 
 35 See Farber, supra note 33, at 14 (providing an example of a drone equipped with a high-quality 
camera in 2014); Holy Stone HS170 Mini RC Predator, supra note 34 (providing an example of an 
inexpensive drone that can fly for at least sixty minutes after a six to eight minute charge time). 
 36 See Farber, supra note 33, at 15–16 (detailing the multiple drones used by the U.S. military and 
various law enforcement agencies, one of which can fly for forty-eight hours uninterrupted and anoth-
er equipped with a 1.8 gigapixel color camera). 
 37 See Rule, supra note 14, at 163–64 (providing numerous examples where current property law 
was unclear in determining whether drone operators could be held liable, criminally or civilly, for 
operating their machines in airspace above private land). 
 38 See Heidi Hall, Nashville Entrepreneur Flies Drone to Film Fireworks, TENNESSEAN (July 6, 
2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/local/2014/07/05/nashville-fireworks-drone-video/
12245831/ [https://perma.cc/T3SY-WFTS] (describing how a man in Nashville, Tennessee, flew his 
drone into the middle of the city’s Fourth of July fireworks show, which caused a potentially danger-
ous situation that was not prohibited by state law or FAA regulations at the time); Colleen Wright, 
Regulatory Vacuum Exposed After ‘Peeping Drone’ Incident, SEATTLE TIMES (July 7, 2014), http://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/regulatory-vacuum-exposed-after-lsquopeeping-dronersquo-
incident/ [https://perma.cc/62TG-62JM] (discussing a situation in which a drone operator, who was 
attempting to take pictures of a residential high-rise building in Seattle for a developer, accidentally 
took pictures of a female resident while she was changing and arguing that the drone operator’s ac-
tions fell within an undeveloped area of the law); see also Editorial Board, Drones Are Coming: PNC 
Park’s Aerial Visitor Is a Warning for the Future, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 6, 2014), http://
www.post-gazette.com/opinion/2014/07/06/Drones-are-coming/ stories/201407030106?pgpageversion=
pgevoke [https://perma.cc/G3BA-AVAG] (reporting on a drone owned by a private citizen that flew 
over a Major League Baseball game in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and arguing that, while the drone 
flight in this instance was harmless, the incident demonstrates how easily a drone could cause serious 
harm to people in a crowded area). 
 39 See Rule, supra note 14, at 164 (stating that, while drones can be incredibly valuable to local 
law enforcement due to their reasonable size and ability to survey the land from the air at a low cost, 
questions such as whether a warrant must be obtained to use a drone for surveillance purposes and the 
admissibility of footage obtained without a warrant or a private landowner’s permission to fly above 
their land remain unsettled in most jurisdictions). Some states have passed their own statutes that limit 
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The commercial sector, however, will likely be the largest source of the 
coming influx of drones in the United States.40 Massive companies that make 
direct deliveries to consumers, such as Amazon, spend as much as eleven per-
cent of their revenue on traditional shipping costs via airplane or ground deliv-
ery.41 If these companies can begin to make a majority of their deliveries by 
drone, their shipping costs will decrease drastically.42 As such, they will likely 
want to ramp up the production of drone fleets as soon as possible.43 Drones 
will not only be used in commerce for delivery purposes.44 They are also being 
used, or will be used, in areas ranging from film production to disaster relief 
efforts.45 
The FAA enacted a small rule in June 2016 to regulate the flight of drones 
for both commercial and private purposes.46 An administration within the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
law enforcement’s ability to use drones for surveillance. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)(a) (2013) 
(stating that law enforcement agencies in Florida “may not use a drone to gather evidence or other 
information”). There are usually exceptions to this far-reaching rule against police use of drones for 
surveillance. See, e.g., id. § 934.50(4)(a)–(c) (listing the criteria for when law enforcement agencies 
can use drones for surveillance). For example, Florida law enforcement can use drones for surveil-
lance if (1) there is a credible, high risk of an impending terrorist attack, as determined by the U.S. 
Secretary of Homeland Security; (2) the law enforcement agency in question obtains a search warrant, 
signed by a judge, for the use of a drone; or (3) the law enforcement agency reasonably believes that a 
drone is needed to take rapid measures against looming, serious danger to life or property, to prevent 
the escape of a suspect or the destruction of evidence, or to search for a missing person. Id. 
 40 See Juan Plaza, The Impact of Commercial UAVs on Corporate America Part 1, COM. UAV 
NEWS (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.expouav.com/news/latest/impact-commercial-uavs-corporate-
america-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/97FT-CJ4M] (stating that numerous large corporations are planning 
to eventually make most of their deliveries by drone so drone production and, therefore, use will ex-
plode in the near future). 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. (standing for the proposition that, in the long term, the cost of transporting goods via a 
fleet of autonomous drones will be less than the cost of paying for employees and the maintenance of 
delivery vehicles). The use of autonomous drones to deliver packages directly from Amazon’s ware-
house to the customer’s home would help the company to save costs during the very expensive “last 
mile,” where a delivery driver must exit the vehicle and deliver the package to the customer’s home. 
Id. The last mile is the most expensive part of a delivery because of the time needed for the driver to 
deliver each individual package along his or her route; it is a highly inefficient process that accounts 
for a significant portion of each package’s shipping cost. Id. An autonomous drone fleet owned by 
Amazon that can deliver packages directly to consumers would eliminate the high costs associated 
with the last mile for all deliveries to consumers living close enough to a distribution center, which in 
turn would allow Amazon to focus its use of expensive ground transportation on customers that are 
inaccessible by drone. Id. 
 43 See Plaza, supra note 40 (demonstrating the incentive for companies to expand drone usage). 
 44 See Rule, supra note 14, at 160–62 (discussing the application of domestic drone usage in nu-
merous other industries). 
 45 Id. In addition to their use in the movie industry and disaster relief efforts, utility companies, 
pipeline companies, border control agencies, firefighters, volcano researchers, severe weather experts, 
agribusiness, journalists, and real estate agents have already used drones to make their work easier. Id. 
 46 See generally SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), supra note 11 
(detailing all of the major provisions included within the FAA small rule). As a federal agency created 
by Congress, the FAA has the power to create and implement regulations like Small Rule 107 for a 
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Department of Transportation, the FAA is responsible for overseeing and regu-
lating almost all aspects of civil aviation safety.47 Because the FAA does every-
thing from implementing policies that promote the safest, most efficient use of 
U.S. airspace to creating hiring criteria and training for air traffic controllers, 
the administration has a massive amount of control over civil aeronautics in 
the United States.48 
When creating regulations that govern the flight of aircraft in the United 
States, the FAA is statutorily required to, among other factors, “[protect] indi-
viduals and property on the ground.”49 While FAA Small Rule 107 certainly 
protects the physical safety of people on the ground by prohibiting drones from 
flying over individuals not involved with the flight, it does not guard against 
invasions of an individual’s privacy or interference with his or her property 
rights.50 
Some municipalities and states have enacted their own laws regulating 
drone flight, the majority of which govern drone operation or flight by individ-
uals for non-commercial purposes.51 While these laws, especially the Wiscon-
sin state statute, protect the privacy of individuals, they do little to protect in-
                                                                                                                           
variety of reasons, including the emergence of new technologies affecting the agency’s legal area of 
focus. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2 (2011), https://
www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8WB-
SJLL]. In promulgating a new regulation, the agency must provide notice to the public that it is con-
sidering issuing a proposed rule and allow interested parties to comment on the proposed rule. Id. at 3. 
In promulgating a final rule, once all of the comments, relevant scientific data, expert opinions, and 
facts have been collected (collectively, the “rulemaking record”), the agency “must base its reasoning 
and conclusions on the rulemaking record.” Id. at 6. After creating a final rule, the agency must pub-
lish the new rule in the Federal Register and amend any regulations affected by the new rule in the 
Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 9. 
 47 See 49 U.S.C § 106(g)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (providing that the FAA shall enforce and regulate all 
statutes relating to civil aviation safety, except for the “transportation, packaging, marking, or descrip-
tion of hazardous material”); What We Do, supra note 1 (listing the various roles played by the FAA 
within the U.S. government, including the promotion of safety within civilian aviation and the stimu-
lation of both civil aeronautics and advancement of aviation technology). 
 48 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (providing that the FAA must promulgate regulations that promote safe 
and efficient use of U.S. airspace by aircraft); id. § 44506 (listing all of the factors to be considered by 
the FAA when developing training and hiring policies for air traffic controllers). 
 49 Id. § 40103(b)(2)(B). It is unclear from the text of the statute whether protection of people and 
property on the ground refers only to their physical safety. See id. (failing to further define physical 
safety). 
 50 See SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), supra note 11, at 1 
(providing that a pilot cannot fly his or her drone over an individual unconnected with the flight who 
is not under a covered structure but failing to include any protections for the property rights of low-
altitude airspace or individual privacy). 
 51 See, e.g., Trost, supra note 6, at 16–18 (providing examples of a municipal law in Green Bay, 
Wisconsin, and a Wisconsin state law that restrict when and how hobbyists may fly their drones). The 
municipal law prohibits flying a drone below four hundred feet above a special event, including foot-
ball games, fireworks shows, and the city’s annual art festival. Id. at 16. The state law is stricter and 
imposes liability for a Class A misdemeanor on any drone operator who uses his or her drone for 
voyeuristic purposes. Id. at 18. 
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dividual property interests.52 This is because the Wisconsin state law only pun-
ishes drone operators who use their drone for voyeuristic purposes; the law 
does not impose liability upon those who simply invade the airspace above a 
property owner’s land without using the drone to take pictures or video of the 
individuals living on the land.53 
B. Common Law Trespass 
At common law, trespass is essentially defined as the intentional, unper-
mitted entry onto the land of another, regardless of whether any damage to the 
property itself occurred.54 In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston v. Rogers, 
for instance, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the former parishioners 
of a closed-down church were trespassing by holding a vigil on the structure’s 
steps.55 Because the Archbishop of Boston owned the church and told the pa-
rishioners to “move on” from their vigil, the court relied on Section 158 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts to hold that the parishioners were trespassers.56 
An individual does not have to remain on the land for it to constitute a 
trespass.57 In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
held that the defendant, a mobile home delivery company, was liable for tres-
pass after crossing the plaintiffs’ farm field to deliver mobile homes to the 
plaintiffs’ neighbors.58 The defendant did so, despite being told not to by the 
plaintiffs, because it would be far more time-consuming and costly for the de-
fendant to make deliveries via a nearby private road.59 The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that there is an important public interest in protecting landowners 
from intentional trespassers and that one hundred thousand dollars in punitive 
damages was appropriate to deter such behavior and uphold property rights.60 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. (noting that critics have complained about the Wisconsin state law’s failure to protect 
property rights in addition to privacy rights). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (explaining that one is liable for trespass if he or 
she “intentionally (a) enters land in possession of the other, or causes a thing or third person to do so, 
or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to 
remove”). 
 55 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bos. v. Rogers, 39 N.E.3d 736, 743 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). The 
court noted that a number of factors, such paying real estate taxes and utility bills for the property, 
clearly indicate that the Archbishop owned the property. Id. at 742. 
 56 Id. at 742–43. The parishioners intentionally entered and remained on church property without 
justification or excuses, thus making them trespassers. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 158). 
 57 Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160–61 (Wis. 1997) (holding that a mobile 
home company’s repeated crossing an individual’s lawn to deliver mobile homes is a trespass that 
warrants punitive damages). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 157. 
 60 Id. at 160–61 (describing the strong interest individuals have in excluding trespassers from 
their land and explaining that landowners should feel secure knowing that they can vindicate their 
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Although the intrusion was brief, fleeting, and caused no serious damage to the 
plaintiff’s land, the court nevertheless held that the defendant’s actions consti-
tuted a trespass.61 
A trespass must also be a tangible invasion of the landowner’s property.62 
Intrusions by matter such as dirt, dust, noise, and vibrations are usually not con-
sidered the type of physical invasion necessary to sustain a trespass action.63 
Common law trespass doctrine applies to more than just the unauthorized, 
intentional intrusion onto the surface land of another.64 Rather, an individual or 
entity can commit common law trespass “on, beneath, or above the surface of 
the earth.”65 Under traditional property law, a land owner holds the rights to 
the land itself, the air above it, and the ground below it, a concept known as the 
ad coelum doctrine.66 The ad coelum doctrine thus embodies the proposition 
that trespass can occur below, on or above one’s land, stating “land has an in-
definite extent, upwards, as well as downwards, so as to include everything 
terrestrial, under or over it.”67 In light of the doctrine, it would seem that a 
drone or other aircraft entering the air above someone’s land would be an ob-
vious trespass.68 Naturally, however, the ad coelum doctrine is not enforced 
literally in a modern era dominated by aerial travel.69 In regards to aerial tres-
pass, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that aircraft flight above anoth-
er’s property can be a trespass only if the craft “enters into the immediate 
                                                                                                                           
property rights in the courts). The court upheld the trial jury’s award of $100,000 in punitive damages. 
Id. at 163. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron, 602 N.W.2d 215, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (hold-
ing that dust, noise, and vibrations caused by a mining operation were intangible intrusions onto the 
plaintiff’s land, thereby defeating the plaintiff’s claim of trespass). 
 63 E.g., id. But see Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959) (“[W]e may 
define trespass as any intrusion which invades the possessor’s protected interest in exclusive posses-
sion, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be meas-
ured only by the mathematical language of the physicist.”). 
 64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (stating that trespass can occur above the land as 
well). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61 (noting that the owner of land under the ad coelum doctrine 
has rights to the land that “extend[] to the periphery of the universe”). The Latin phrase from which 
the doctrine is derived is “[c]ujus est solum, ejus es usque ad coelum,” which translates as “[t]o 
whomever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky.” Rule, supra note 14, at 166. The full phrase is 
“[c]ujus est solum, ejus es usque ad coelum et ad inferos.” Id. at 166 n.53. 
 67 Chad J. Pomeroy, All Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 
284 (2015). 
 68 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 261 (noting that under a literal application of the ad coelum doctrine in 
the modern world, “every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass 
suits”). 
 69 See id. at 287–88 (explaining that federal statutes and regulations and Supreme Court precedent 
have all but precluded the literal enforcement of the ad coelum doctrine). Prior to the invention of the 
airplane, anything that invaded a property owner’s airspace was very close to the ground—making the 
ad coelum doctrine conceptually easy to apply. Id. at 286. 
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reaches of the airspace next to the land” and seriously hinders the property 
owner’s ability to use and enjoy the land.70 Courts reached this modern under-
standing of aerial trespass gradually.71 
Numerous cases demonstrate the practical approach courts have taken to 
the application of the ad coelum doctrine in the modern era.72 In 1925, in Her-
rin v. Sutherland, for instance, the Montana Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant, standing on a neighboring parcel, committed a trespass by firing his 
shotgun over the plaintiff’s property.73 In 1906, in Butler v. Frontier Telephone 
Co., the New York Court of Appeals decided that a telephone company’s at-
tempt to hang a telephone wire thirty feet above the plaintiff’s property consti-
tuted a trespass.74 In 1872, in Smith v. Smith, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that barn eaves hanging over the boundary line between two 
neighbors’ parcels of land was a trespass.75 Similarly, in 1905, in Puroto v. 
Chieppa, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the defendants’ addition to 
their home, which hung one inch over the boundary line between the defend-
ants’ and plaintiffs’ property, constituted a trespass at common law.76 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. It is unclear whether drones are considered “aircraft” as understood by the Restatement’s draft-
ers in 1965, but Small Rule 107’s requirement that UAS fly under four-hundred feet at all times will 
likely lead to drones entering “the immediate reaches of the airspace next to the land.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2); see SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), su-
pra note 11, at 1 (stating that UAS must generally fly at a maximum altitude of four-hundred feet). For 
reference, an average two-story house is typically between twenty and twenty-five feet tall, meaning that 
a drone flying at the maximum height of four hundred feet would be between sixteen and twenty times 
higher in the air than an average two-story house. See How Tall Is a Two Story House?, REFER-
ENCE.COM, https://www.reference.com/art-literature/tall-two-story-house-39352dafb18b8121# [https://
perma.cc/7ZB9-GSUU] (providing the average height of a two-story house and providing the factors that 
determine how tall a two-story house will stand). At this height, a drone would be visible, but almost 
certainly inaudible, from the ground. See Harvest Zhang, Why Are Drones So Loud?, QUORA.COM (Mar. 
7, 2016), https://www.quora.com/Why-are-drones-so-loud [https://perma.cc/X5KN-3DEW] (stating that 
an individual on the ground would likely not hear or notice a typical drone unless they were already 
aware of its presence). 
 71 See infra notes 72–92 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of judicial understand-
ing of aerial trespass). 
 72 See, e.g., Herrin, 241 P. at 331 (referring to the ad coelum doctrine and holding that shooting a 
shotgun over someone’s property is a trespass). 
 73 Id. at 331–32. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s land included ownership of all space 
above and below it and that firing a shotgun over plaintiff’s land impeded his ability to use and enjoy 
his property. Id. 
 74 Butler, 79 N.E. at 718. Like in Herrin, the court in Butler held that the plaintiff owned the 
space inhabited by the defendant’s wire; therefore, the defendant was liable for trespass upon the 
plaintiff’s property. Id. 
 75 Smith v. Smith, 110 Mass. 302, 304 (Mass. 1872). The court noted that if the plaintiff never 
brought a trespass action against the defendant, the defendant would likely have a valid claim for 
adverse possession if the eaves continued to hang over the boundary line between their properties for 
twenty years. Id. An adverse possession claim requires the plaintiff to occupy the defendant’s property 
without permission, which is trespassing. Id. 
 76 Puroto v. Chieppa, 62 A. 664, 665 (Conn. 1905). Although there was no specific injury to the 
plaintiffs attributable to the defendant’s home addition, the court nevertheless decided that the plain-
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Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. represents an early application of the 
ad coelum doctrine to low-flying aircraft.77 In this case, the plaintiffs resided 
near the Worcester, Massachusetts, airport and brought a trespass claim to en-
join the airport from allowing planes to fly at low altitudes above their proper-
ty.78 Here, the court held that such low-altitude flights did constitute trespass 
and explained that property rights cannot be diminished due to the emergence 
of the aviation industry.79 
In 1936, six years after New England Aircraft was decided in Massachu-
setts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a near op-
posite approach to reject the ad coelum doctrine in Hinman v. Pacific Air 
Transport.80 Like New England Aircraft, Hinman involved plaintiffs suing over 
the flight of airplanes above their property.81 Yet, rather than finding for the 
plaintiffs through the literal application of the ad coelum doctrine, the Hinman 
court instead decided that in order for a plane to trespass airspace, the property 
owner must use the airspace in a way that is connected with the use or enjoy-
ment of the land.82 The court went on to state that, in its view, ad coelum as 
applied literally was never good law and emphasized the importance of basing 
a charge of aerial trespass upon its effect on the use and enjoyment of the 
land.83 
In 1946, in United States v. Causby, the Supreme Court settled the place 
of the ad coelum doctrine in the modern world and sided with the Hinman 
court in stating “[the ad coelum doctrine] has no place in the modern world.”84 
The Court went on to explain that the literal application of the ad coelum doc-
trine would interfere with Congress’s intention to use the skies as a medium for 
transportation.85 Although it rejected the ad coelum doctrine, the Court found 
that the plaintiff-property owners did have enforceable rights against low-
                                                                                                                           
tiffs were entitled to nominal damages as a result of the legal injury caused by the defendant’s tres-
pass. Id. 
 77 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 393 (Mass. 1930). 
 78 Id. at 386–87. The judge found that many planes flew as low as one-hundred feet above the 
plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 387. 
 79 Id. at 393. The court decided that, although the defendants had committed trespass, the damag-
es were not substantial enough to warrant injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs. Id. at 393–94. 
 80 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936) (abrogating the ad coelum 
doctrine). 
 81 Id. at 756. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants flew their commercial airplanes as low as 
one-hundred feet above their property—the same altitude that the defendants flew their planes in New 
England Aircraft. Id. at 756; New England Aircraft, 170 N.E. at 387. 
 82 Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61. 
 85 Id. at 261. The Court stressed that, if applied as understood in ancient times, the ad coelum 
doctrine would subject airline companies and pilots to near limitless liability for trespass every time 
they operated an airplane. Id. 
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flying aircraft that diminished their use and enjoyment of the land.86 Further-
more, the Court exempted aircraft from the ad coelum doctrine because they 
move goods and people exponentially faster than any other mode of transporta-
tion.87 The plaintiffs in Causby sued the U.S. government under the theory that 
its low-flying aircraft constituted a taking, but this case would undoubtedly be 
brought as a trespass action if the plaintiffs sued a private party that flew air-
craft at a similar altitude over their land.88 
Importantly, and perhaps unfortunately, the Court in Causby did not spec-
ify just how much airspace a property owner owns above his or her land.89 The 
Court instead used a rather vague standard, holding that property owners only 
have dominion over the airspace within the “immediate reaches” of the par-
cel.90 The immediate reaches test states that the property owner owns only air-
space that he or she could “occupy or use in connection with the land.”91 The 
Court also held that the immediate reaches test covered airspace that, when 
entered into by an unwanted party, “[subtracts] from the owner’s full enjoy-
ment of the property.”92 
In 1974, the Tenth Circuit grappled with the application of the “immedi-
ate reaches” doctrine in Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith.93 In Pueblo 
of Sandia, a legally recognized Indian tribe sued the owner of a neighboring 
private airport for aerial trespass, alleging that arriving and departing aircraft 
consistently flew over the tribe’s property at altitudes of one-hundred-fifty feet 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See id. at 266–67 (agreeing with the lower court in its holding that low-flying aircraft over 
one’s property can create an actionable burden if it affects the use and enjoyment of the property). In 
Causby, the plaintiffs sought to establish that a taking of their land had occurred because the U.S. 
military, occupying a municipal airport directly adjacent to plaintiffs’ property, was the entity flying 
the planes over their land. Id. at 258–60. The flights not only startled the plaintiffs and negatively 
impacted their ability to sleep, but also destroyed their ability to run and maintain a chicken farm on 
their property. See id. at 259 (describing how one-hundred-fifty chickens killed themselves by flying 
into the walls of the coop in terror from the sound of the jet engines and how the sounds of the aircraft 
severely diminished the farm’s output). 
 87 See id. at 260–61 (stating that the literal application of the ad coelum doctrine “has no place in 
the modern world” because it would disrupt the use of high-altitude airspace as the “public highway” 
as Congress had deemed); Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 293 (arguing that aircraft transporting people 
and goods need and use high-altitude air rights more than landowners who would have a property 
interest in those same air rights under the ad coelum doctrine). 
 88 Causby, 328 U.S. at 258; see Hinman, 84 F.2d at 756 (involving plaintiffs who brought a tres-
pass action against a private party that flew aircraft at a low altitude over their property); New Eng-
land Aircraft, 170 N.E. at 386–87 (involving a plaintiff who sued a neighboring airport for aerial tres-
pass as a result of aircraft flying at low altitudes over the plaintiff’s property). 
 89 Causby, 328 U.S. at 266 (stating that the Court did not, at the time of the opinion, have to de-
cide where the line between private and public airspace lies). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 264. 
 92 Id. at 265. 
 93 Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (10th Cir. 1974). 
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or less.94 Ultimately, the court declined to find that an aerial trespass had oc-
curred because, although a flight that is one-hundred-fifty feet above the 
ground may be within the immediate reaches of the land, the plaintiffs did not 
allege that the low-altitude aircraft using defendant’s airport substantially inter-
fered with the use of the land.95 
Under the ambiguous principles expressed in Causby, questions still re-
main about the upper-limit of “immediate reaches,” what constitutes an occu-
pation or use “in connection with the land,” and what kinds of aerial activities 
by outside parties “subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property.”96 
At the time Causby was decided, the immediate reaches standard was success-
ful in settling the debate over whether landowners had enforceable rights 
against airplanes flying at high-altitude under the ad coelum doctrine.97 Due to 
the FAA small rule’s requirement that civilian drones must fly at an altitude 
below four-hundred feet, however, it will be much more difficult to reliably 
determine whether a property owner has a cause of action against the operator 
of a drone flying in the low-altitude airspace above his or her property.98 
C. Common Law Nuisance and Privacy Rights 
At common law, landowners can also enforce their property rights 
through an action for private nuisance.99 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
provides that an individual can be held liable for nuisance if, but only if, his or 
her conduct constitutes an intrusion of the property owner’s interest in their 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. at 1044. 
 95 Id. at 1045. 
 96 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–66 (explaining the immediate reaches standard and the factors to 
be considered when deciding whether airspace is within the immediate reaches of an individual’s 
land); Rule, supra note 14, at 168–69 (discussing the questions left about airspace rights post-
Causby). 
 97 Rule, supra note 14, at 169 n.81 (describing how, at the time Causby was decided and immedi-
ately thereafter, federal law mandated that aircraft fly at altitudes certainly higher than what the Court 
envisioned as falling within the immediate reaches of one’s land) (citing STUART BANNER, WHO 
OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 259–60 
(2008) (explaining that the after the Court’s decision in Causby, cases involving aerial trespass be-
came less common and the debate over aerial trespass generally subsided)). 
 98 See SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), supra note 11, at 1 (stating 
that UAS must generally fly at a maximum altitude of four-hundred feet); Nabiha Syed & Michael 
Berry, Journo-Drones: A Flight over the Legal Landscape, 30 J. MEDIA INFO. & COMM. L. 1, 30 
(2014) (explaining that while flying a drone in the low-altitude airspace above an individual’s proper-
ty may constitute a trespass, in the end, established law cannot conclusively determine how a judge 
would decide such a case); see also Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-
Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 198 (1990) (describing landowners’ rights as to the low-
altitude airspace above their land as a “property rights ‘no-man’s land,’” in which neither property 
owners nor those who would enter said low-altitude airspace understand the legal ramifications of 
doing so). 
 99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (describing the general 
elements of conduct that would subject one to liability for a private nuisance). 
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ability to privately use and enjoy the land, and such intrusion is either “(a) in-
tentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under 
the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnor-
mally dangerous conditions or activities.”100 The comments to Section 822 of 
the Restatement clarify that, unlike trespass, an action for nuisance is supposed 
to protect a specific interest or interests in the land.101 Thus, a successful nui-
sance claim must show that the defendant’s intrusion of the plaintiff’s land 
somehow injured his or her ability to use and enjoy the land. 102 
Other sections of the Restatement also clarify the elements necessary to 
succeed in a nuisance claim.103 Section 824 states that a nuisance can occur as 
the result of an overt act or a failure to act by the defendant when he or she has 
the duty to do so.104 Section 825 specifies that an invasion of an owner’s inter-
est in the use and enjoyment of his or her land is intentional when the actor 
acts with the purpose of injuring the owner’s interest in the use or enjoyment 
of the land, or knows that such an injury will result or is substantially certain to 
result from the act.105 Section 826 outlines what makes an intentional invasion 
unreasonable and states that an invasion is such if the “gravity of the harm” is 
greater than the “utility of the actor’s conduct,” or if the actor could compen-
sate the landowner without undue financial burden.106 Sections 827 and 828 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. To succeed in a nuisance action against a drone operator, a property owner would likely 
have to prove that the intrusion was intentional and unreasonable; it seems unlikely that someone 
would be flying a drone unintentionally. See SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE 
(PART 107), supra note 11, at 2 (specifying that drones subject to the new small rule must be operated 
by a remote pilot); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (providing the “intentional 
and unreasonable” invasion prong of liability for nuisance). 
 101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. b. 
 102 Id. Commentators have already discussed how landowners may claim that low-flying drones 
over their property significantly interferes with their ability to use and enjoy the land. See, e.g., Mi-
chael A. Thompson, The Emerging Field of Drone Law, ARK. LAW., Nov. 13, 2016, at 28 (noting that 
property owners would likely worry about their safety and privacy if drones are constantly flying over 
their homes and that the sight and sound of drones could interfere with an individual’s use and enjoy-
ment of his or her property). 
 103 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 824–831 (discussing the conduct necessary to 
liability, intentionality, unreasonableness of an intentional invasion, gravity of harm, utility of con-
duct, malicious or indecent conduct, severe harm, avoidable invasions, and conduct unsuited to a 
locality). 
 104 Id. § 824. 
 105 Id. § 825. The comments clarify that no malicious intent is required on the part of the defend-
ant to constitute an intentional invasion—if the defendant knows he or she is causing an invasion of 
the owner’s interest in using and enjoying the land, then this element is met. Id. cmt. c. Furthermore, 
once the actor knows he or she has caused an invasion, any further invasions will be deemed inten-
tional. Id. cmt. d. Most nuisance cases involve multiple or repeated invasions, so this concept of inten-
tionality usually applies. Id. 
 106 Id. § 826. When weighing the gravity of the harm to the landowner versus the utility of the 
actor’s conduct, the court must examine both the gravity and the utility from an objective, legal stand-
ard. Id. cmt. d. For example, a court should not use a plaintiff’s subjective annoyance with the defend-
ant’s activity as the benchmark for determining the gravity of the harm caused. Id. When determining 
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detail a list of factors to be considered when determining the gravity of the 
harm against the landowner’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land and 
the utility of the defendant’s conduct, respectively.107 The factors to be consid-
ered in determining the gravity of the harm are (1) the extent and character of 
the harm; (2) the social value of the use or enjoyment harmed as determined by 
the law; (3) whether the use or enjoyment harmed is particularly important to 
the locality, and (4) how easily the property owner could avoid the harm.108 To 
determine the utility of the conduct that causes the harm, the court should ex-
amine (1) the social value of the primary purpose of the conduct as determined 
by the law; (2) whether the conduct is particularly important to the locality; 
and (3) how easily the actor could avoid the invasion of the property owner’s 
use or enjoyment of their land.109 
A leading case that demonstrates the application of common law nuisance 
doctrine is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company in which the plaintiffs sued a 
neighboring cement factory under a nuisance theory for consistently making 
loud noise and emitting dust into the air around their homes.110 The New York 
Court of Appeals, in 1970, agreed with the plaintiffs that the dust, dirt, and 
noise emitted by the defendant constituted a nuisance because it interfered with 
their use and enjoyment of the land.111 The court, however, decided that it 
would be too costly to shut the factory down and accordingly denied the plain-
tiff’s request for an injunction and allowed the defendant to pay permanent 
damages to the plaintiffs as a way to end the ongoing litigation.112 
                                                                                                                           
the utility of the defendant’s conduct, “the conduct for which the utility is being weighed includes 
both the general activity and what is done about its consequences.” Id. cmt. e. Thus, the utility of a 
noisy factory emitting large amounts of smoke would be greatly reduced if the owner did nothing to 
compensate his or her neighbors. Id. 
 107 Id. §§ 827–828. The factors for both tests are to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 108 Id. § 827. The factors listed in § 827 to determine the gravity of the harm are not exhaustive, 
and the weight of each factor’s determinativeness will depend on a case-by-case basis analysis. Id. 
cmt. b. Rather, in some cases the gravity of the harm will be determined by one factor, whereas in 
others the gravity of the harm will be based upon a combination of all of the factors. Id. The circum-
stances of the harm must be considered as well; loud noises at night, for example, will likely be 
deemed more serious than loud noises during the day. Id. 
 109 Id. § 828. To determine the utility of the conduct in question, the court should primarily rely 
upon the social value attributed to the conduct. Id. cmt. b, e. However, although the conduct’s social 
value is the primary factor in determining its utility, all three factors must be supported by some utility 
in order for a court to hold that the conduct’s utility overall outweighs the gravity of the harm to the 
landowner’s interest in the use and enjoyment of their land. Id. cmt. c. 
 110 Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). 
 111 See id. (stating that “a nuisance has been found after trial” but denying a request for an injunc-
tion). The court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s conduct constituted a nuisance. 
Id.; see Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (finding that the 
defendant created a nuisance because “the discharge of large quantities of dust upon each of the prop-
erties and excessive vibration from blasting deprived each party of the reasonable use of his property 
and thereby prevented his enjoyment of life and liberty”). 
 112 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 874–75 (ordering the defendant to pay permanent damages). 
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Unlike aerial trespass cases, there are far fewer instances of courts ad-
dressing what constitutes an aerial nuisance.113 The case that exemplifies the 
difference between aerial trespass and aerial nuisance is Brenteson Wholesale, 
Inc. v. Arizona Public Service Co., decided by the Arizona Court of Appeals in 
1990.114 The defendant-appellee, Arizona Public Service Company, asserted in 
its counterclaim that an airstrip used by its neighbor, the plaintiff-appellant 
Brenteson Wholesale, Inc., to deliver Christmas trees harvested in the Pacific 
Northwest constituted either a trespass or a nuisance.115 The court held that the 
plaintiff-appellant’s use of the airstrip could not be a trespass because the de-
fendant-appellee never claimed that the descending aircraft entered its air-
space.116 The appeals court, however, upheld the trial court’s injunction on 
Brenteson’s use of the airstrip because, although there were no physical inva-
sions of the defendant-appellee’s airspace, the use of airstrip by the plaintiff-
appellant negatively impacted the Arizona Public Service Company’s ability to 
use and enjoy its land.117 The court also noted the Restatement’s assertion that 
harms caused by aircraft that do not physically enter the low-altitude airspace 
above an individual’s property should be assessed under the principles of nui-
sance law rather than trespass law.118 
A claim for invasion of privacy, specifically intrusion upon the seclusion 
of another, may support a nuisance claim against a drone operator.119 The de-
                                                                                                                           
 113 Compare Brenteson Wholesale, Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Service Co., 803 P.2d 930, 934 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1990) (deciding that the operator of overflights that do not physically enter the immediate reach-
es of a landowner’s airspace can still be held liable under a nuisance theory), with Causby, 328 U.S. at 
264–66 (discussing the factors to be considered when determining whether an overflight constitutes an 
aerial trespass), Hinman, 84 F.2d at 756 (deciding whether low-flying aircraft over an individual’s 
land can be held liable for aerial trespass in the Ninth Circuit), and New England Aircraft, 170 N.E at 
386–87 (deciding whether low-flying aircraft over an individual’s land can be held liable for aerial 
trespass in Massachusetts). 
 114 Brenteson Wholesale, 803 P.2d at 934 (discussing the difference between aerial trespass and 
aerial nuisance and why the facts of the case established a successful claim for aerial nuisance rather 
than an aerial trespass). 
 115 Id. at 932, 934. The trial court enjoined the plaintiff-appellant from using its airstrip on the 
grounds that such use would create an “unreasonable risk” of trespassing into defendant-appellee’s 
airspace and potentially striking a power line on the defendant-appellee’s property. Id. at 933. The 
trial court was overturned on the trespass determination, but the nuisance claim was allowed. Id. at 
934. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. The court focused on the fact that plaintiff-appellant’s use of the airstrip created a “great 
risk of trespass” and increased the likelihood of serious accidents if an aircraft were to collide with a 
power line on defendant-appellee’s property. Id. 
 118 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. m (explaining that the operators of 
overflights which do not enter the immediate reaches of an individual’s land may still invade the land-
owner’s ability to use and enjoy the land and, as such, a determination of liability will fall under nui-
sance law rather than trespass). 
 119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (explaining that one is liable for intrusion 
upon the seclusion of another if the defendant’s intrusion “upon the solitude or seclusion of another or 
his private affairs or concerns . . . would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”). 
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fendant is liable under this tort if his or her intrusion “would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person.”120 An intrusion upon seclusion that would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person on his or her own property would also 
likely qualify as interfering with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of their 
land.121 This is because an intrusion upon a landowner’s seclusion that is high-
ly offensive to a reasonable person would likely be considered unreasonable 
under common law nuisance analysis.122 
II. EXAMINING THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW  
TRESPASS AND NUISANCE TO LOW-FLYING DRONES 
It is unclear exactly how a court would decide whether a drone flying in 
the low-altitude airspace above an individual’s property exposes the operator 
to liability for either trespass or nuisance.123 This Part discusses the factors that 
would need to be examined in a claim by a private landowner for either tres-
pass or nuisance as a result of drone operation above his or her land.124 Section 
A examines how the concepts of common law trespass would apply to a drone 
flying in the low-altitude airspace above an individual’s land.125 Similarly, Sec-
tion B analyzes how the concepts of common law nuisance would apply to a 
drone flying in the low-altitude airspace above an individual’s land.126 
A. Applying the Principles of Common Law Trespass to Low-Flying Drones 
Under traditional notions of trespass, operating a drone over an individu-
al’s land would almost certainly subject the pilot to liability.127 The landowner 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. 
 121 See id. cmt. b (providing examples of behavior that would subject a defendant to liability un-
der this tort, including looking into the plaintiff’s windows with binoculars); id. § 822(a) (explaining 
that an intrusion onto another’s land that prevents the landowner from full enjoyment and use of his or 
her land is a nuisance if the intrusion is intentional and unreasonable). 
 122 Id. §§ 652B, 822(a). Because the common law treats seclusion and privacy within one’s own 
property as an important right to be protected, such an invasion would likely be considered a grave 
harm under nuisance law that outweighs the utility of the intruder’s conduct. Id. §§ 652B, 827. 
 123 See, e.g., Rule, supra note 14, at 165 (noting that current property law, as it is understood 
today, is not clear in establishing what rights a property owner has to keep drones or other low-flying 
objects out of the airspace directly over their parcel); Thompson, supra note 102, at 28 (noting that 
property owners’ worries about safety, privacy, and noise could foreseeably lead to claims that the 
operation of a drone above an individual’s real property is a nuisance and that the validity of these 
hypothetical claims is still unsettled law). 
 124 See infra notes 127–165 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 127–154 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 155–165 and accompanying text. 
 127 See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160–61 (Wis. 1997) (holding that a 
mobile home company’s repeated crossing of an individual’s lawn to deliver mobile homes is a tres-
pass that warrants punitive damages); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (explaining that one 
is liable for trespass if he or she “intentionally (a) enters land in possession of the other, or causes a 
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would only have to prove that the drone entered the airspace above the land 
and that the owner did not previously allow the entry.128 Situations in which a 
commercial drone flies over a landowner’s property to make a delivery, or 
where a private operator flies their drone above someone’s property, are both 
analogous to the defendant’s actions in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., in 
which the mobile home delivery company repeatedly crossed the plaintiffs’ 
farm field to make deliveries without causing any damage to the land itself.129 
Similarly, a private operator who hovers their drone above an individual’s 
property acts in a way similar to the parishioners in Roman Catholic Archbish-
op of Boston v. Rogers who refused to abandon the vigil they created after their 
former church closed down.130 Furthermore, any situation in which a drone 
enters the low-altitude airspace above a landowner’s property would constitute 
a tangible, as opposed to intangible, invasion.131 Unlike dust, dirt, noise, and 
vibrations, a drone would be a physical, tangible thing that invades the proper-
ty of a landowner.132 As the operator causing a tangible drone to intrude upon 
the property of another, the drone pilot would thus be liable for trespass.133 
Clearly, under the ad coelum doctrine, a private landowner would have a 
valid claim for trespass against the operator of a drone flying at any level 
above his or her property.134 Under this formulation of private property rights, 
an operator would only need to fly his or her drone over an individual’s prop-
erty, regardless of altitude, to expose himself or herself up to liability for tres-
pass.135 The Supreme Court, however, specifically abrogated the literal appli-
                                                                                                                           
thing or third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing 
which he is under a duty to remove”). 
 128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158. 
 129 See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160–61 (crossing a property owner’s land without permission is 
comparable to crossing the low-altitude airspace above a landowner’s land without their permission). 
 130 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bos. v. Rogers, 39 N.E.3d 736, 743 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) 
(holding that plaintiffs who refused to leave a vigil they created at a closed-down church still owned 
by the Archbishop of Boston were trespassers under the basic Restatement definition of trespass). 
 131 See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron, 602 N.W.2d 215, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (hold-
ing that dust, noise, and vibrations caused by a mining operation were intangible intrusions onto the 
plaintiff’s land, thereby defeating the plaintiff’s claim of trespass). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id.; Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160–61. 
 134 See, e.g., Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 393 (Mass. 1930) (holding that 
the low-flying planes which became common with the emergence of the aviation industry did not 
supersede the rights afforded to property owners under the ad coelum doctrine); Herrin v. Sutherland, 
241 P. 328, 331 (Mont. 1925) (deciding that firing a shotgun over a neighbor’s parcel constituted a 
trespass under the ad coelum doctrine). 
 135 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (stating that, under the ad coelum doc-
trine, individuals would have a valid claim for trespass against the operator of any transcontinental 
flight). Because the ad coelum doctrine envisages the landowner as having title to all of the land be-
neath his property and all of the airspace above it, the Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine to 
transcontinental flights in the middle of the twentieth century is analogous to how the literal applica-
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cation of the ad coelum doctrine as applied to aircraft in United States v. Caus-
by, which seems to preclude its use to determine private property owner’s air 
rights with respect to civilian drones.136 
The use of the ad coelum doctrine in regard to civilian drones may not be 
completely precluded, however, depending on whether drones are considered 
the type of “aircraft” that are specifically immune from the application of the 
ad coelum doctrine.137 The key reason why the Court in Causby exempted op-
erators of these aircraft from liability under the ad coelum doctrine was the fact 
that they afforded society a legitimate benefit—the ability to be exponentially 
more efficient in moving people and goods.138 Thus, whether the ad coelum 
doctrine can be applied to civilian drones, both private and commercial, would 
depend partly upon a balancing test between the benefits afforded to society by 
drone use and the cost to the landowner of drones operating in the low-altitude 
airspace above his or her property.139 If drones are not used for transporting 
people or goods, then they lack the underlying rationale for the exemption to 
the ad coelum doctrine and thus might not be exempted from the doctrine.140 
Drones used for non-commercial purposes, such as recreation, or, on a 
more sinister level, watching unsuspecting individuals while at home, would 
likely fail such a test because they do not help transport people or goods.141 
                                                                                                                           
tion ad coelum doctrine would affect drone operators today. Id.; see Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 284 
(providing a definition of the ad coelum doctrine). 
 136 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 261 (stating “[the ad coelum doctrine] has no place in the modern 
world”); Rule, supra note 14, at 166 (arguing that the growth of aviation in the twentieth century 
quickly caused the ad coelum doctrine to become outdated). 
 137 See Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 292–94 (arguing that drones used purely for surveillance pur-
poses are not the kind of aircraft excepted from the ad coelum doctrine by the Court in Causby). 
 138 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61 (relying on Congress’s desire for freedom for the movement 
of people and goods through the sky as the basis for rejecting the literal application of the ad coelum 
doctrine); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (noting that the American Law Institute is unsure 
as to whether “space rockets, satellites, missiles, and similar objects” fall within the scope of the im-
mediate reaches test, promulgated by the Court in Causby, for aerial trespass committed by aircraft); 
see also Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 294 (arguing that the kinds of aircraft excepted from the ad coe-
lum doctrine by the Court in Causby are those that carry people or commercial goods and do not dam-
age the land over which they fly). 
 139 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65 (explaining that aircraft that fly very close to an individual’s 
land are not afforded the same protection against a claim for common law trespass as are aircraft that 
fly at high-altitude and that low-flying aircraft which negatively impact the landowner’s ability to use 
and enjoy his or her land are liable for trespass); Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 293 (arguing that surveil-
lance drones do not provide the same benefit to society as aircraft used to transport people and com-
mercial goods and, therefore, should not be afforded the same protections against liability as said 
aircraft). 
 140 Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 293. 
 141 See id. at 293–94 (arguing that surveillance drones, and by extension other drones incapable of 
moving people or goods, should not be considered aircraft when determining whether to apply the ad 
coelum doctrine to their flight above private property). It seems difficult to discern any benefit to the 
individual operator of any drone used to spy on others on their own property that would outweigh the 
harm caused to the landowner. See Nick Bilton, When Your Neighbor’s Drone Pays an Unwelcome 
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Although they are not widely utilized now, the drones that companies like Am-
azon want to use for the rapid delivery of products to consumers would likely 
have a stronger argument for exemption from the ad coelum doctrine.142 A 
company such as Amazon, however, is already able to deliver products rapidly 
to its customers, thus leaving the question of whether the benefit of a thirty-
minute delivery is so great that these drones should be classified as aircraft 
under ad coelum.143 
Even if civilian drones, both private and commercial, are considered air-
craft exempted from the ad coelum doctrine, a potential trespass can still be 
explored under the immediate reaches test enunciated by the Court in Caus-
by.144 Airspace that is within the immediate reaches of the land includes that 
which the property owner could “occupy or use in connection with the land” 
and airspace which, when entered into by an unwanted party, “[subtracts] from 
the owner’s full enjoyment of the property.”145 It seems likely that there will be 
drones that enter the immediate reaches of individuals’ property, as the FAA 
small rule governing civilian drone flight proscribes a maximum flying altitude 
of four-hundred feet.146 Unfortunately, there is no bright-line rule that an-
                                                                                                                           
Visit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/style/neighbors-drones-
invade-privacy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/H48S-AK6H] (providing examples of instances where 
private, individual drone operators have come into conflict with landowners after spying on them 
while they are on their own property). Similarly, concerns to landowners about safety and noise result-
ing from the low-altitude flight of drones above their property seem to outweigh the benefit to a be-
nign, recreational drone operator. See Thompson, supra note 102, at 28 (noting safety and noise as 
reasons why a landowner would want to keep drones from flying above his or her property). 
 142 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61 (relying on Congress’s desire to encourage air commerce as 
the one of the bases for rejecting the literal application of the ad coelum doctrine); Pomeroy, supra 
note 67, at 293 n.99 (clarifying that drones which function to accomplish goals other than surveillance 
may fall within the category of aircraft exempted from the literal application of the ad coelum doc-
trine); see also Mott, supra note 4 (reporting that Amazon is currently developing autonomous drones 
that will be able to deliver packages weighing five pounds and under to customers within thirty 
minutes of their order and that these drones will be able to fly twenty miles round-trip). 
 143 See Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 292 (explaining that the aircraft exception to the ad coelum 
doctrine is predicated on the revolutionary speed in which airplanes could transport people and com-
mercial goods in the middle of the twentieth century); Give the Gift of Prime, https://www.amazon.
com/gp/prime/pipeline/prime_gifting_landing? [https://perma.cc/3JX2-2XJZ] (listing the numerous 
benefits of Amazon Prime membership, the most popular of which is free two-day shipping on over 
fifty million products available for purchase through the website). 
 144 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–66 (explaining the immediate reaches standard that must be used 
to determine whether an aircraft violated a landowner’s airspace property rights). 
 145 See id. at 264–65 (providing the “occupy or use in connection with the land” require-
ment”[subtracts] from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property” requirement). 
 146 See generally SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107) (implementing a 
number of rules that govern the flight of drones in the United States, including a maximum altitude of 
four-hundred feet). Since four-hundred feet is the maximum, individuals will likely fly at much lower 
heights than that maximum. Id. 
2156 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2135 
nounces just exactly how high the immediate reaches of an individual’s air-
space begins.147 
Although there is no exact measurement as to what height is considered 
within the immediate reaches of the land, the Tenth Circuit’s 1974 decision in 
Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith highlights the need for a landowner to 
also show that the low-altitude aerial invasion interfered with their use and 
enjoyment of the land.148 In Pueblo of Sandia, the court held that flights arriv-
ing at and departing from the defendant’s private airport, at heights of one-
hundred-fifty feet and below over the plaintiff’s land, did not satisfy the im-
mediate reaches test as set out in Causby because the flights did not substan-
tially interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to use and enjoy the land.149 In the 
case of a camera-equipped, private drone flying in the low-altitude airspace 
above an individual’s land, the landowner would likely have a strong argument 
that their ability to use and enjoy the land has been substantially interfered 
with by alleging that they cannot feel comfortable on their own property when 
being monitored by an aerial voyeur.150 In the context of commercial drones, 
which will likely dominate the skies once fully developed by various compa-
nies, a landowner would be able to argue that the constant sight, sound, and 
safety concerns that would result from a copious amount of drones in the low-
altitude airspace above their home substantially interfere with their ability to 
use and enjoy any land not covered by a home or structure.151 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. l (explaining that there is no concrete 
definition of the Court’s “immediate reaches” standard as set out in Causby). 
 148 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65 (providing the additional requirements that flights within the 
immediate reaches of the land must also enter airspace that the owner could “occupy or use in connec-
tion with the land” and that such entry must negatively impact the owner’s ability to fully enjoy their 
property); Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding 
that continuous flights of one-hundred-fifty feet or lower over the plaintiff’s land did not constitute 
trespass because the flights, while low, did not substantially interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to use 
the land). 
 149 Pueblo of Sandia, 497 F.2d at 1045. 
 150 See id. (holding that continuous flights of one-hundred-fifty feet or lower over the plaintiff’s 
land did not constitute trespass under the immediate reaches test because there was no substantial 
interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the land); Thompson, supra note 102, at 28 
(arguing that, among other issues, individual landowners likely have valid concerns that camera-
equipped drones will infringe upon their expectation of privacy when on their own real property). A 
property owner who cannot use all or part of their outdoor land because of a voyeuristic low-flying 
drone would certainly have a strong argument that the drone is not only in the immediate reaches 
above their land, but also that it substantially interferes with their ability to use and enjoy the land as 
well. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65 (providing the additional requirements that flights within the 
immediate reaches of the land must also enter airspace that the owner could “occupy or use in connec-
tion with the land” and that such entry must negatively impact the owner’s ability to fully enjoy their 
property); Pueblo of Sandia, 497 F.2d at 1045 (requiring substantial interference with the plaintiff’s 
ability to use and enjoy the land, in addition to entry into the airspace within the immediate reaches of 
the land, in order to sustain an aerial trespass action post-Causby). 
 151 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65 (providing the additional requirements that flights within the 
immediate reaches of the land must also enter airspace that the owner could “occupy or use in connec-
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The Restatement suggests, for instance, that flying an aircraft fifty-feet 
from an individual’s land, and preventing the owner from fully enjoying the 
property, is clearly a trespass.152 A flight at one-hundred-fifty feet that also im-
pedes the owner from full enjoyment of the land, however, would likely pre-
sent a question of fact to the court.153 Thus, under current law, determining 
whether operation of a drone is a trespass will depend on a fact intensive, case-
by-case basis.154 
B. Applying the Principles of Common Law Nuisance to Low-Flying Drones 
Unlike a trespass action against a drone operator, a successful nuisance 
claim does not require that the drone enter the immediate reaches of the land-
owner’s airspace so long as it interferes with the owner’s use and enjoyment of 
his or her land.155 The first element of a nuisance claim is that the intrusion 
was intentional, and since the operator must know where he or she is flying if 
they are able to control the drone, it seems highly unlikely that any drone 
would unintentionally fly over someone’s land.156 Given the numerous con-
flicts between drone operators and individuals on the ground, the operator 
must also know that he or she is invading a landowner’s ability to fully use and 
enjoy their property when flying over it at a low altitude.157 Therefore, whether 
a drone flight or repeated drone flights over an individual’s property consti-
                                                                                                                           
tion with the land” and that such entry must negatively impact the owner’s ability to fully enjoy their 
property); Thompson, supra note 102, at 28 (arguing that the continuing presence of drones overhead, 
the noise they make, and the safety concerns associated with a drone falling out of the sky all provide 
landowners with plausible claims that their ability to use and enjoy the land has been hindered). 
 152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. l (explaining that there is no concrete defini-
tion of the Court’s “immediate reaches” standard as set out in Causby). 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 266 (declining to announce the exact limits of the immediate reaches 
test); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. l (providing that some aerial trespass cases must 
be resolved based upon a question of fact). 
 155 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. m (explaining that the operator of a flight 
outside of the immediate reaches of the surface that nevertheless interferes with the owner’s ability to 
use and enjoy the land can be held liable under a claim of nuisance); id. § 822 (providing the general 
elements for a successful nuisance claim). 
 156 See Farber, supra note 33, at 12, 14 (stating that a drone is controlled by its operator using 
such equipment as a controller, tablet, or smartphone). 
 157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825(b) (providing that the intentional invasion 
requirement to succeed in a nuisance claim is satisfied when the actor knows their conduct invades the 
owner’s ability to use and enjoy the land or when such conduct is substantially certain to do so); see 
also Rule, supra note 14, at 163–64 (describing instances of conflict between drone operators and 
both individual and institutional landowners after flying a drone above the owner’s property); Bilton, 
supra note 141 (discussing different examples of conflict between drone operators and individuals 
whose land they have flown over, including multiple instances of landowners shooting drones out of 
the sky). 
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tutes a nuisance will turn on whether the flight invades the owner’s interest in 
using and enjoying the land and whether such invasion was unreasonable.158 
A drone flying at low-altitude seems almost certain to provide a landown-
er with arguments as to how it invades his or her interest in the use and enjoy-
ment of the land because noise, privacy, and safety concerns all appear to be 
factors that would prohibit someone from fully enjoying their real property.159 
Drones outfitted with cameras seem especially likely to invade one’s interest in 
use and enjoyment of their land, as most owners are likely to feel uncomforta-
ble being photographed or videotaped without consent while on their own 
property.160 To determine if an invasion of airspace is unreasonable, however, a 
court would have to make a case-by-case determination as to whether the grav-
ity of the harm caused by the drone flight outweighs its utility.161 
Generally, a landowner would have a better nuisance claim against a pri-
vate drone operator, whose drone would likely have a camera, than a commer-
cial drone pilot because there is more utility in promoting commerce than rec-
reational drone use.162 The Restatement provides that, in determining the utility 
of conduct that harms a landowner, a court should principally rely upon the 
social value of the primary purpose of the conduct.163 It seems likely that a 
court would attach a high level of social value to commercial drones, which 
have the potential to revolutionize how Americans engage in commerce, and 
would be reluctant to hamstring a novel innovation that drastically lowers 
shipping costs and makes an online transaction between consumers and com-
panies highly convenient.164 There are also proposed innovative uses for 
                                                                                                                           
 158 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822. 
 159 Id.; see Thompson, supra note 102, at 28 (noting safety, privacy, and noise as reasons why a 
landowner would want to keep drones from flying above his or her property). 
 160 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (stating that one is subject to liability for nui-
sance if, but only if, their conduct invades the landowner’s ability to use or enjoy the land—a re-
quirement that the operation of a drone used to videotape or photograph a property owner would likely 
satisfy); see also Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 293 (providing a hypothetical argument in which owners 
argue that they always enjoy the right to avoid covert, aerial observation when on their land). If full 
use and enjoyment of the land includes not being spied on, then flying a drone with a camera over an 
individual’s property would clearly invade that interest. Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 293. 
 161 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–828 (detailing the factors to be considered 
when weighing the gravity of the harm versus the utility of the conduct that causes the harm). 
 162 Id.; see Holy Stone HS170 Mini RC Predator, supra note 34 (providing an example of an in-
expensive drone that can fly for at least sixty minutes after a six to eight minute charge time). It seems 
unlikely that a court would find the gravity of an invasion of privacy to be outweighed by a private 
drone operator’s interest in flying his or her drone over someone else’s property. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–828 (explaining the numerous factors that must be considered when 
determining whether the gravity of the harm caused outweighs the utility of the offender’s conduct). 
The value that society places on a particular harm is part of the nuisance analysis, and since society 
values privacy, this is a cognizable harm in a nuisance claim. Id. § 827. 
 163 Id. § 828. 
 164 See id. cmt. b, e (stating that the conduct which causes the harm’s social value is the primary 
factor in determining its utility); see also Trost, supra note 6, at 16 (providing a highly innovative 
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drones that would further increase their social value if implemented, such as 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s desire to build drones that can bring inter-
net access to remote areas.165 
III. FAA REGULATION AND STATE LEGISLATION IS THE BEST WAY  
FOR LANDOWNERS TO VINDICATE THEIR PROPERTY  
RIGHTS AND PROTECT PRIVACY 
While a landowner could succeed in a suit for trespass or nuisance against a 
pilot flying their drone in the low-altitude airspace above an individual’s proper-
ty, individual lawsuits are not the best way to protect property rights due to po-
tential problems in both establishing trespass or nuisance liability and adminis-
trative impracticality in bringing these lawsuits to court.166 In light of the diffi-
culties property owners face in lawsuits, this Part argues that different approach-
es should be taken to protect individual property rights against commercial and 
private drones.167 Section A explains why lawsuits are not the best way to en-
force private property rights.168 Section B recommends numerous steps the FAA 
could take to regulate the burgeoning commercial drone industry.169 Section C 
argues that the protection of individual property rights against privately flown 
drones should be left to municipalities and states, rather than the FAA.170 
A. Individual Lawsuits Are Not the Best Way to Protect Property Rights 
A landowner could potentially bring a claim for trespass or nuisance 
against the operator of a drone flying above his or her property.171 A drone fly-
ing low above an individual’s property is analogous to more conventional situ-
ations in which trespass liability was found.172 If drones are not considered 
                                                                                                                           
potential use for drones by Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg who wants to use drones to bring inter-
net access to remote parts of the world); Plaza, supra note 40 (describing how large online retail com-
panies, such as Amazon, can significantly decrease both shipping costs and the time needed to deliver 
a package to a customer by implementing their own fleets of autonomous drones). 
 165 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. b, e (emphasizing the social value of the 
harmful conduct as the most important factor in determining its utility); see also Trost, supra note 6, 
at 16 (describing Zuckerberg’s vision of drones that can bring internet access to areas of the world in 
which it is otherwise inaccessible). 
 166 See supra notes 123–165 and accompanying text (explaining the failings of individual lawsuits 
to resolve property right disputes regarding drone usage). 
 167 See infra notes 171–210 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 171–186 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 187–200 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 201–210 and accompanying text. 
 171 See supra notes 123–165 and accompanying text (explaining how common law trespass and 
nuisance principles would apply to a low-flying drone above a landowner’s property). 
 172 See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text (analogizing different circumstances in 
which a drone flies low above an individual’s land to more traditional trespass cases where the intru-
sion took place on the ground). 
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“aircraft,” then they may not be exempted from ad coelum under the test laid 
out in United States v. Causby, and their operators could be liable for trespass 
when operating above private property.173 Landowners also have potential ar-
guments that low-flying drones invade their use and enjoyment of their proper-
ty, which would support a nuisance claim.174 A nuisance claim’s success would 
rest on a balancing test between the gravity of the harm caused by the drone 
and the utility of its operation.175 
Substantively, trespass lawsuits are not the most efficient way to protect 
landowners because of the lack of clarity with regard to (1) whether drones are 
“aircraft” for the purposes of ad coelum; (2) where the “immediate reaches” of 
the land begins; and (3) whether a drone would substantially interfere with a 
landowner’s ability to use and enjoy the land.176 Nuisance lawsuits are similar-
ly unsuited to protect landowners’ rights because the judge’s determination in 
balancing the utility of drone flight versus the harm caused by the flight would 
decide the result, which could lead to inconsistent outcomes.177 
Furthermore, commercial drones will likely be autonomous, capable of 
delivering their packages without being controlled by human pilots on the 
ground.178 Without a camera or a live feed to a commercial drone itself, indi-
vidual landowners should not have to worry much about a commercial drone 
operator spying on them through a camera.179 Regardless of whether a land-
owner could bring successful trespass or nuisance actions against a company, 
doing so would be highly difficult to administer.180 Assuming the skies are 
filled with drones within the next ten years, it will be very difficult for land-
owners on the ground to figure out which company owns the drone flying over 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (using air commerce as a justifica-
tion for exempting aircraft from the ad coelum doctrine); Pomeroy, supra note 67, at 294 (arguing that 
aircraft carrying people and goods are exempted from ad coelum because of the benefit they provide 
to society). 
 174 See supra notes 155–165 and accompanying text (defining such potential arguments). 
 175 See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text (discussing balancing test). 
 176 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–66 (presenting the aircraft exception, immediate reaches test, and 
substantial interference requirement); see also supra notes 136–147 and accompanying text (arguing 
that it is unclear how these concepts would apply to low-flying drones). 
 177 See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text (discussing factors that would influence a 
judge’s decision in balancing the utility of the conduct versus the gravity of the harm). 
 178 Mott, supra note 4. 
 179 See id. (explaining that consumers will be able to print out a landing pad on their computers 
which Amazon’s future drone fleet will scan and locate when making a delivery, making a human 
pilot unnecessary). 
 180 See Froomkin & Calo, supra note 32 (describing how the FAA predicts at least seven million 
drones will be flying in U.S. skies by 2020). The sheer number of drones in the sky will present a 
number of problems for landowners seeking to vindicate their property rights, for companies trying to 
avoid litigation, and for a court system trying to keep up with lawsuits involving new technology. See 
infra notes 179–184 and accompanying text (describing these problems in more detail). 
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their land.181 If it is difficult to identify the owner of the drone, landowners will 
not be able to vindicate their air rights in court because they will not know 
whom to sue.182 The large companies that would be vulnerable to these suits due 
to their potentially widespread use of commercial drones would certainly want to 
avoid common law liability for trespass and nuisance in all fifty states.183 
The courts will also have a difficult time dealing with the massive influx 
of cases brought by landowners against commercial drone operators.184 Not 
only will these cases back up the court system, but it will also be difficult for 
judges to determine how a reasonable person would respond to a commercial 
drone above their property.185 Drone technology is so new that people do not 
know what constitutes reasonable use, which would likely lead to inconsistent 
outcomes in similar fact patterns.186 
B. The FAA Should Impose Regulations on Commercial Drones 
Given the complications that will arise should the common law be the on-
ly way for individuals to vindicate their property rights against drones, com-
prehensive regulation by the FAA would be the more efficient, smooth option 
with respect to commercial drones.187 The FAA has been tasked with promul-
gating regulations to promote the safe and efficient use of U.S. airspace by air-
craft and was specifically tasked with promulgating UAS regulations in 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See Froomkin & Calo, supra note 32 (explaining the expected explosion in drone use by 
2020); see also Mott, supra note 4 (detailing Amazon’s vision for the company’s fleet of drones). 
 182 See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (stating that a civil action begins once the plaintiff files a complaint with 
the court and that the plaintiff must identify the defendant to do so). If the plaintiff does not know who 
the party is that they want to sue, then they cannot successfully bring an action against the defendant 
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 183 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that any corpo-
ration can be sued in states where it does systematic and continuous business but is not physically 
located). Surely nationwide companies such as Amazon, FedEx, and 7-Eleven would fall within this 
definition and be liable to suits in all fifty states. Id. 
 184 See Froomkin & Calo, supra note 32 (explaining that the number of drones in the sky is ex-
pected to exponentially increase by 2020 and will likely continue to increase over time). Given the 
increasing number of drones that will fly in U.S. skies, it is only logical that suits against their opera-
tors will increase as well. Id.; see Bilton, supra note 141 (discussing different examples of conflict 
between drone operators and individuals whose land they have flown over, including multiple in-
stances of landowners shooting drones out of the sky). 
 185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (explaining that an invasion of an individual’s 
land is trespass if it interferes with his or her use and enjoyment of the land and is intentional and 
unreasonable). Given the novelty of drone technology, society likely doesn’t quite know what is rea-
sonable and what is not in this context. Id. 
 186 See id. (standing for the proposition that if judges do not have a consistent understanding of 
what is reasonable when flying a drone, then it is more probable than not that cases with similar facts 
will come out differently). 
 187 See supra notes 171–186 and accompanying text (explaining the problems that would arise if 
the common law was the only way for landowners to protect their property and privacy rights against 
low-flying drones above their property). 
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2012.188 Large companies like Amazon plan to use fleets of drones to deliver 
their products to consumers across the country.189 Given the nature of Ama-
zon’s business, in which it is engaged in the sale of goods in interstate com-
merce to individuals all over the United States, the Commerce Clause will also 
give the FAA the power to regulate commercial drone deliveries.190 Thus, the 
FAA almost certainly has jurisdiction to regulate all drones.191 
As the executive agency responsible for overseeing the use of U.S. air-
space, the FAA can regulate drones without having to worry about the compli-
cations that arise with applying common law concepts of trespass and nuisance 
to drone flight.192 The FAA would not have to argue whether drones are “air-
craft” for the purposes of ad coelum, nor would it have to make showings to a 
court about whether a drone entered the “immediate reaches” of land.193 Feder-
al regulation would also allow for the protection of all property owners without 
requiring them to individually go to court to enforce their rights to the air 
above their land and would apply evenly to all drone operators.194 
The FAA should certainly impose a minimum height limit on commercial 
drones in transit, as this would ameliorate many noise and privacy concerns 
likely to arise amongst property owners.195 The FAA could also ban cameras 
on commercial drones, which would alleviate privacy concerns.196 Conversely, 
the FAA could require companies to fly their drones above public roads used 
by cars, which would assuage many of the issues that arise when a drone flies 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2012) (tasking the FAA with promulgating regulations to promote 
the safe and efficient use of U.S. airspace by aircraft); see also Federal Aviation Administration Mod-
ernization and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 40101) (requiring the FAA to promulgate regulations that integrate UAS into the national 
airspace). 
 189 Mott, supra note 4 (describing Amazon’s plans for its fleet of delivery drones). 
 190 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (stating that the power of Congress, and in 
this case an agency created by Congress, to regulate matters involved in interstate commerce is “ple-
nary”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 191 See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text (describing the FAA’s power to regulate 
drones under both its regulatory authority and the Commerce Clause). 
 192 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (giving the FAA the power to oversee the use of navigable airspace 
in the United States). 
 193 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–66 (presenting the aircraft exception and immediate reaches 
test). 
 194 See supra notes 171–186 and accompanying text (presenting the problems that come with only 
relying on the courts to enforce owners’ rights against low-flying drones). 
 195 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 102, at 28 (noting that property owners would likely worry 
about their safety and privacy if drones are constantly flying over their homes and that the sight and 
sound of drones could interfere with an individual’s use and enjoyment of his or her property). 
 196 See Wright, supra note 38 (discussing a situation in which an individual used a drone to take 
pictures of a high-rise apartment by hovering the drone outside the window of a female tenant who 
was changing clothes at the time). 
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above private property.197 Finally, the FAA could create a private right of ac-
tion for landowners to bring against drone operators in violation of FAA regu-
lations, which would allow for lawsuits without the complications posed by the 
common law.198 
The FAA is best suited to regulate commercial drones because it can en-
sure both uniform enforcement of regulations against operators and uniform 
results for property owners seeking to protect their property rights.199 Although 
the FAA can regulate both commercial and privately-operated drones, the 
states are best suited to regulate private drone operators.200 
C. The Protection of Individual Property Rights Against Private Drone 
Operators Should Take Place at the State Level 
Unlike commercial drones, privately operated, recreational drones are not 
involved in interstate commerce; therefore, their operators would likely not be 
subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause.201 The FAA could still 
use its regulatory authority outside of the commerce clause, however, to regu-
late private drone operators.202 
Regardless of the FAA’s authority, states and municipalities have already 
shown that they are capable of regulating private drone operators via local or-
dinances or state statutes.202 Florida’s anti-drone surveillance statute, for in-
stance, provides a civil cause of action for any “owner, tenant, occupant, in-
vitee, or licensee of privately owned real property” against a drone operator 
who either records an image of said real property or records an image of the 
                                                                                                                           
 197 Id.; Froomkin & Calo, supra note 32 (arguing that programming drones to follow existing 
global positioning system (GPS) routes can ameliorate concerns that individual property rights will be 
invaded when drones fly over landowners’ property). 
 198 See supra notes 123–165 and accompanying text (explaining the ambiguities in the common 
law doctrines of trespass and nuisance as applied to low-flying drones). 
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 202 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)(b) (2013) (prohibiting individuals in Florida from using a 
drone to take photographs or video of an individual’s private real property or from photographing or 
filming an individual on private real property where they would have a reasonable expectation of 
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individual while they are on the premises of the real property.203 This broad 
statute effectively provides individuals with more privacy protection than a 
trespass claim would because it does not require the drone to enter the low-
altitude airspace above the parcel of private real property being recorded in 
order to impose liability on the operator.204 Rather, this statute looks more like 
a broader nuisance action because it is aimed at protecting an individual’s spe-
cific interest in the land—in this case, the maintenance of a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from voyeuristic surveillance.205 
States have the inherent ability to legislate for the general welfare of their 
citizens.206 A statute like Florida’s, which is aimed at protecting privacy, cer-
tainly falls within the general welfare.207 In fact, the FAA has stated that laws 
traditionally left to the states under the general police power, such as land use, 
zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement, should generally continue to be 
left to the states even if they involve drones.208 
Additionally, state legislatures are best suited to handle the possible 
harms to their citizens’ property rights caused by private drone operators for 
two reasons: (1) it is much easier to identify the operator of a private drone 
than it is to identify the operator of an autonomous commercial drone; and (2) 
landowners have strong arguments that an invasion of privacy by a low-flying 
drone above their property substantially impacts their ability to use and enjoy 
the land.209 Laws aimed at protecting landowners’ privacy and property rights 
vis-à-vis private drone operators falls within the states’ ability to legislate for 
public welfare and thus should be left to the states so that they may tailor such 
laws to the needs and desires of their residents.210 
                                                                                                                           
 203 Id. § 934.50(5)(b). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the near future, both private and commercial drones will dominate U.S. 
airspace. While such technology will certainly innovate the day-to-day lives of 
Americans, the rapid growth of drones should not completely outweigh the 
property rights of individual citizens. While individual property owners may 
be able to bring suit under theories of trespass or nuisance, the outcome of 
such a suit is unclear. Furthermore, litigation in this context is simply not an 
efficient way to protect property rights. In the context of commercial drones, 
the FAA should promulgate regulations that apply uniformly to all drones used 
for commercial purposes. This would provide clarity for both landowners and 
operators. State legislation, however, is best to protect landowners’ property 
and privacy rights against private individuals flying drones. Such legislation 
falls within the province of the states’ legislative authority and would allow 
each state to legislate based upon the needs and desires of its residents. 
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